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Abstract—This research investigates how Internet users 
comment in response to rumor corrections posted on social 
media. The focus is specifically on the degree to which aggressive 
language is used. As the test cases for investigation, the research 
looks into two rumor corrections on YouTube. The rumors were 
set in the context of the riots and protests in Jakarta following 
the Indonesian presidential election in 2019. A total of 1,000 
comments (500 comments from each of the two cases) was 
admitted for content analysis. In one case, anti-correction voice 
was dominant, highlighting the failure of the rumor correction 
to refute the rumor. In the other, pro-correction voice was 
dominant, indicating the success of the rumor correction. 
Aggressive language was widely used in the latter. Implications 
of the findings are highlighted. 
Keywords—online hate speech; online rumor; 
misinformation; rumor correction video; YouTube. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background 
Rumors have been around for centuries [1], and the 
Internet is only the latest means of communication to be 
abused for the spread of such unsubstantiated messages [2, 3]. 
Specifically, communication on social media poses a 
challenge when rumors spread as if they were facts and 
become viral quickly on the Internet [4, 5, 6]. 
Rumors have serious repercussions and sometimes fuel 
mob violence [7]. For instance, rumors on social media have 
resulted in fatal mob attacks in countries such as India [7]. 
Many a time, rumors are propagated deliberately for 
malicious purposes. The ultimate motives can vary from 
political to religious [8, 9]. Regardless of the motives, the 
effectiveness of any rumor campaign directly depends on how 
much it affects public perceptions in real-time, often referred 
to as personal involvement [9, 10, 11]. 
Authorities such as governments, companies, and social 
media administrators are starting to recognize that rumors 
must be proactively corrected [12]. Therefore, they are now 
setting up services (e.g., rumor verification and correction 
websites, anti-rumor campaigns, etc.) to debunk rumors that 
are utterly false [13]. Social media channels are also used to 
spread rumor corrections. For this research, rumor corrections 
refer to messages that debunk false rumors and provide 
explanations to strengthen the truthiness of the rebuttals [12, 
14, 15]. 
Although rumor corrections are intended to debunk 
rumors [14, 15], they might not always work effectively [16, 
17]. Rumor corrections sometimes even backfire, which is 
explained by what is known as the backfire effect—the 
phenomenon whereby corrective evidence contradicts 
individuals' prior beliefs and hence ironically strengthens the 
truthiness of rumors rather than that of rumor corrections [18]. 
B. Research Gaps and Research Objectives 
Previous works on rumor corrections have mostly 
examined the psychological factors associated with 
individuals' worldview [15, 16, 18, 19]. These works suggest 
that individuals' worldview often influences their processing 
of the corrections. When the corrections are worldview-
dissonant, a backfire effect can occur [16, 18]. Such a 
backfire effect can be found embedded in anti-correction 
responses [3], which exhibit not only distrust of the 
authorities but also a rejection of the given correction. An 
aggressive tone is often used to voice out such responses. 
The use of aggressive language in online comments has 
been studied under different domains, ranging from its 
relation to anonymity [20] and cyberbullying [21, 22] to its 
appearance in news website [23]. Previous works found that 
aggressive comments often use disparaging words towards a 
target source, which has been defined as name-calling, and 
thus, represents a form of online incivility and hate speech 
[24, 25, 26]. Aggressive comments are likely to make their 
presence felt amid the cat-and-mouse game between rumors 
and corrections in the realm of social media communication. 
Users could reflect their attitudinal dispositions either in 
favor of or against the argument forwarded by rumor 
corrections. However, no study has specifically revealed the 
extent to which such aggressive comments tend to appear in 
response to rumor corrections in the online setting. 
To address the research gap, this research investigates how 
Internet users comment in response to rumor corrections on 
social media. The focus is specifically on the degree to which 
aggressive language is used. As the test cases for 
investigation, the research looks into two rumor corrections on 
YouTube. The rumors were set in the context of the riots and 
protests in Jakarta following the Indonesian presidential 
election in 2019. 
The two cases were chosen for two reasons. First, both 
cases attracted attention on social media websites. Therefore, 
a substantial volume of comments could be collected for a 
meaningful analysis. Second, public reception to each of the 
selected case was different: the public mostly accepted one 
rumor correction while the other was not received favorably. 
Hence, the two cases allow for an interesting cross-case 
comparison. 
This research makes the following contributions. On the 
theoretical front, it extends the limited literature on rumor 
corrections [3, 12, 14] by providing insights into the 
effectiveness of video rumor corrections on social media. One 
of the few works on online rumors and corrections to be 
conducted in the context of Indonesia, it also examines users’ 
responses in terms of online aggression. On the practical front, 
this research can inform practitioners about factors that 
determine the effectiveness of rumor corrections. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The following 
section describes the methods employed in this research, 
which included two subsections. The first subsection provides a 
description of the two cases. The second subsection includes 
the process of data collection and data annotation. The results 
are discussed in Section III. Thereafter, the paper concludes by 
highlighting its limitations and future directions. 
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. Descriptions of the Two Cases 
The first rumor case was a riot video shot in Kampung 
Bali. A group of police was shown to be beating a seemingly 
innocent teenager. This video, which made the rounds on 
Twitter, was accompanied by the narrative that the victim was 
a young protester who later passed away due to the attack 
[27]. The incident happened in the aftermath of the 
Indonesian presidential election. Later, the National Police 
confirmed the victim to be neither dead nor a teenager [28]. 
To correct the rumor, the National Police presented the 
victim, who was accused of collecting stones to hurl at others 
amid the unrest [28]. The news conference video was used to 
correct the rumor, and was disseminated on social media 
websites, including YouTube. 
The second rumor case included a photo that became viral 
on Facebook and WhatsApp. It showed three policemen 
wearing face coverings. They were being accused of 
originally coming from China because of their appearance 
[29]. The narrative accompanying the rumor photo further 
asserted that these policemen communicated in Chinese [29]. 
Two days later, the National Police presented the policemen at 
a news conference in front of the media [30]. They removed 
their face coverings and spoke in the Indonesian language. 
They further confirmed that they were Indonesians, 
specifically from North Sumatra. To correct the rumor, a video 
of the news conference, which also shows the hoax spreader’s 
arrest [31], was made available on YouTube. 
B. Data Collection and Annotation 
Publicly available comments on YouTube were collected 
for the two rumor cases. YouTube was chosen because it is 
one of the widely used social media websites in Indonesia 
[32]. Moreover, the two rumor correction YouTube videos 
attracted substantial public comments on YouTube. The 
videos were searched by using phrases related to the two 
cases. After that, a relevance check was done on the searched 
results. 
Ten videos for each rumor correction case were identified 
to collect comments. The top fifty comments from each video 
were considered for analysis. Therefore, 1,000 comments 
were admitted for data analysis: 500 comments related to the 
first case (50 comments x 10 videos) plus 500 comments 
related to the second case (50 comments x 10 videos). These 
comments were in Indonesian, with only a few in local 
languages such as Javanese and Sundanese. 
Content analysis was employed to analyze the data. This 
methodological lens helps to annotate and interpret data to 
form themes. Data annotation was done using two annotators 
who were Indonesians and had received training in qualitative 
research methods. The annotators were familiar with the 
context of the two chosen cases. Comments were annotated to 
identify pro-correction voice (i.e., comments that echoed 
favorable response to the rumor corrections) or anti-correction 
voice (i.e., comments that echoed unfavorable response to the 
rumor corrections). Although some comments were related to 
the chosen cases, they did not fall under the category of either 
pro- or anti-correction voices. Such comments were annotated 
as ‘Other’. 
With respect to the first case, the annotators found 54 
comments to echo pro-correction voice and 268 comments to 
echo anti-correction voice. Besides, 171 comments were 
annotated as ‘Other’ (neither pro-correction nor anti-
correction but relevant to the case). The remaining seven were 
annotated as ‘Unrelated’ (off-topic). 
With respect to the second case, 380 comments echoed the 
pro-correction voice, and 31 comments echoed the anti- 
correction voice. While 88 comments were annotated as 
‘Other’, one was annotated as ‘Unrelated’. Table I 
summarizes the comment types in response to the rumor 
correction YouTube videos. 
To identify aggressive comments in each of the rumor 
correction case, the comment types identified as the majority 
in both cases were further annotated inductively to find which 
of them contains a name-calling type of aggression. For the 
purpose of annotation, the use of disparaging words towards 
a target source was considered aggressive [24].  
One of the two earlier annotators annotated all the 
comments for the use of aggressive language. The results are 
discussed below. The excerpts provided are in English and 
have been translated by one of the annotators. The other 
annotator has verified the accuracy of all the translations. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Two rumor correction cases studied provide different 
outlooks. One is dominant with an anti-correction voice, 
signifying the rumor correction's failure to clarify public 
perception. While the other has a predominantly pro-
correction voice, showing that the rumor correction works as 
expected. 
Concerning the first case, more than half of the responses 
are against the rumor correction. Specifically, of those 268 
comments, 74 of them contain name-calling responses. 
Concerning the second case, 380 comments (or a little over 
three quarters) are in favor of the rumor correction, and 188 of 
them call names. Table II presents the total of the comments 
that call names. 
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Pro-correction 
(i.e., in favor of the rumor 
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(i.e., against the 
rumor corrections) 
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“People like him use his 
brain only to provoke 
society!” 
“Lying to the public 
again! Whoever gets 
beaten like that will not 
survive! The media is 
blind!” 
 
“I wish whoever lies will get 
to be punished!” 
 
“Defending deprived 
rights is more honorable 





500 (100%) 380 (76%) 31 (6.20%) 88 (17.60%) 1 (0.20%) 
 
Example 
“Cheers to the Police! 
Arrest all traitors and hoax 
spreaders that only want to 
create disorder!” 
 
“What a mess! Police 
from another country!” 
“Please find who provided 
the funding. Don’t let him  
run away!” 
 
“The first one to watch, the 
first one to comment.” 
TABLE II. TOTAL OF NAME-CALLING COMMENTS 
 
Cases #Samples (%) #Name-calling comments (%) 
First case 500 (100%) 74 (14.80%) 
Second case 500 (100%) 188 (37.60%) 
 
An aggressive comment uses profane language and 
appears disrespectfully towards a person or group [24]. Such 
incivility, when being placed in a particular context, may 
reduce trust [23]. In the context of responses to rumor 
corrections, such an aggressive tone often reflects individuals' 
attitudinal predispositions to keep a side of either pro-or-anti-
correction voices. 
Such aggression is also found in the backfire effect. Being 
defined by [18] as resistance from the public toward a rumor 
correction, responses with a backfire effect appear to 
disadvantage the parties providing the rumor corrections. 
These parties–often coming from authoritative sources–face 
greater distrust from the public when corrections fail. 
Concerning the first case, the backfire effect occurred as 
more than a quarter of comments contain name-calling 
responses to the authorities issuing the rumor correction. 
These comments showed negative perceptions of the rumor 
correction presented and attack relevant authoritative sources. 
The dataset revealed evidence where individuals were unable 
to update their viewpoint in light of the corrections. One of 
the comments showing such inability to update one's 
viewpoint is as follows: “What did these policemen think? 
Such brutality cannot be simply said as ‘wrong procedure’! 
They must be held responsible for this”. Such comment 
captures how the public is more critical toward the police's 
action than the issue of the truthiness of the rumor itself. 
Although authorities strive to convince individuals about 
corrections, they might not always be effective in the task of 
refutation. When the source of a correction is doubted for its 
credibility, individuals' default worldview can override 
corrections.  
Table III shows the details regarding the parties in the first 
case whose names were being called by the aggressive 
comments. 
TABLE III. NAME-CALLING AGGRESSIVE COMMENTS IN THE FIRST CASE 
 Parties whose names were called 
(#Name-calling comments = 74) 
Police Government Media 
#Comments 
(%) 


























“<Name of the 
victim> is the 
incumbent's 
supporter. The 
media is kind of 
freakish!” 
 
Three institutions were being called in the aggressive 
comments: the police, the government, and the media. First, 
55 out of the 74 comments (74.32%) indicated that online 
users call out the police as corrupt and untrustworthy. One 
such example is as follows: “the police are good at 
eliminating traces and making up stories!”. Another 
comment, “Police brutality has been shown to the public! 
Are these people still deserved to be referred to as our 
protectors?” shows that people would instead focus on how 
badly the police force treated the captured protester. In this 
case, how the police handled the situation overshadows the 
debate of whether the victim was a boy, as narrated by the 
rumor. 
Second, 14 out of the 74 comments (18.92%) accused 
the government of lying and hatching conspiracies. For 
instance, comments such as “Hoaxes thrive in a country 
whose government rules arbitrarily” and “the regime’s soap 
opera with <name of the victim> as the leading actor” were 
found. Meanwhile, another comment, such as “the 
incumbent’s administration is afraid of being replaced!” 
exposes how the political tension during the presidential 
election renders the difficult handling of the rumor as 
people’s support is divided. 
Lastly, five out of the 74 comments (6.76%) blamed the 
media. Online users accused the media of helping the 
government and the police. One such example is as follows: 
“both the regime and the media together created hoaxes!” 
Other comments such as, “Does <name of the media> also 
want to lead public opinion? You are just one of those media 
that wants to destroy society!” and “Mainstream media lies 
too much!” further highlight the attack on the media. 
Meanwhile, Table IV displays the details regarding the 
parties in the second case whose names were being called 
by the aggressive comments. Concerning the second case, 
name-calling comments were found to be directed to parties 
other than the authorities. Nearly half of the pro-correction 
comments fired back to either one of these three elements: 
the hoax spreader, the supporters of the contending 
presidential candidate, and the presidential candidate 
himself. 
TABLE IV. NAME-CALLING AGGRESSIVE COMMENTS IN THE SECOND CASE 
 
First, 144 out of the 188 comments (76.60%) indicated 
condemned the action of the hoax spreader. Comments such 
as “Your stupidity is just unreasonable!” and “What you said 
is just an excuse! Say that in front of the judge!” showed the 
anger of these online users. Another comment, such as “I just 
saw the stupidest netizen in the world,” shows how the hoax 
spreader’s action fired back to him. 
Second, 28 out of the 188 comments (14.90%) attacked the 
supporters of the contending presidential candidate. The main 
concern of these 28 comments was that the online users 
deemed the <name of the presidential candidate> supporters 
responsible for the political tension created. Two of them read 
as, “Stupid <name of the supporter group>! Spreading 
hoaxes is their only job.” and “<Name of the supporter 
group> don’t feel alive if they haven’t spread a single hoax!” 
Lastly, 16 out of the 188 comments (8.50%) called the 
name of the contending presidential candidate himself. They 
brought up Prabowo's background information instead, such 
as his Chinese younger brother, his mother, and his genealogy. 
The comments were such as, “The Number 02 (referring to 
Prabowo) is Chinese, why don’t you protest?” and “His 
younger brother has slanted eyes, too!” Other comments 
blamed him for the disorder caused by the widespread rumor. 
One such example is “this whole mess is because of 
Prabowo’s conduct.” 
In sum, these comments show how a rumor has the 
potential to bring up many other tangentially-related variables 
into the equation regarding its veracity. Especially when it is 
in a presidential election, such aggressive comments tend to 
add more fuel to the polarization already created. 
As presented earlier, the authorities took the same 
procedure when correcting the two rumors; that is, by 
introducing persons involved in the rumor setting in front of the 
media to debunk the widespread misinformation. However, as 
discussed earlier, while the second case seems to be able to 
correct the rumor and enable the authorities to take control of 
the situation, the first case falls short.  
One of the factors behind such a phenomenon is whether or 
not existing evidence appears to be in favor of the authority 
responsible for correcting the rumor. In the second case, the 
existing evidence is in the form of a photo taken in such close 
proximity. It makes it easier for people to compare the rumor 
and the correction, mainly when the policemen themselves 
appear before the media's camera correcting the rumor.  
Meanwhile, as already discussed in [3], the rumor’s 
evidence in the first case, which is in the form of short video 
footage, appears to be visually unclear. As a result, online 
users can freely make assumptions and easily resist the rumor 
correction released by authoritative sources. Even when the 
“supposedly” person involved (in this case is the victim 
experiencing the beating himself) appears in front of the media 
to testify that he was the one beaten by the police. It underlines 
how dependent the authorities could be on the evidence being 
rumored around when it comes to the success of correcting a 
rumor.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Correcting rumors in the realm of social media 
communication attracts responses from the public, whether 
they would trust the correction presented or keep denying it 
and believing that the rumor is the truth. Especially in a 
political event such as presidential elections, such responses 
can often contain an aggressive tone that attacks any party 
deemed untrustworthy by the public. This study uncovers 
that such messages could appear in one form or the other 
regardless of whether the majority of the responses given to 
the rumor correction are in favor of or against. 
However, this study suggests that even before the 
authorities release a rumor correction, one could already 
predict how the public will respond based on the existing 
evidence. If the evidence being rumored online is in favor of 
the authorities correcting it, there would be a good chance that 
more pro-correction responses will follow. On the contrary, if 
the evidence is not in their favor, backfire responses will be 
aimed at the authorities—exacerbating the situation. 
It is nonetheless useful to issue corrections to rumors with 
adequate knowledge to ensure that individuals are less likely 
to be influenced by rumors. A set of recommendations for 
creating an effective rebuttal are as follows: First, corrections 
must emphasize the facts to communicate an explanation that 
helps debunk a rumor belief. With respect to the first case, the 
authorities should have admitted the wrong conduct of the 
police force treating the victim first before proceeding with 
the refutation of the existing misinformation. It would help the 
public understand the press conference context better since 
they do not mix their judgment on the truthiness of the rumor 
with the police brutality. In the second case, the authorities did 
not need to admit any wrong conduct. They could proceed 
directly with correcting the rumor of whether the policemen 
were of Chinese origin or not. 
Second, corrections should rely on evidence. In the first 
case, the existing video footage was recorded from such a far 
 Parties whose names were called 



















be dead! Why 


















family is all 
Chinese!” 
distance—resulting in a low-quality source of information that 
is determinant to the rumor correction’s success. A meticulous 
analysis of the video, such as the body shape of the victim, 
being compared to the presented victim's appearance, might 
help the authorities better refute the rumor. In the second case, 
the evidence in the correction was clear enough for the public 
once the accused policemen were presented before the media, 
removed their coverings, and spoke in the Indonesian 
language.  
Third, the source of the corrections must be trustworthy 
and credible. The source of the correction must be deemed to 
be unbiased and independent. It would make corrections 
reliable and help gain public trust. Rather than using 
mainstream media as the platform to disseminate corrections, 
authorities can use social media channels to spread corrections 
as a means to tackle online rumors. Finally, the paper suggests 
that the use of aggressive language should be discouraged 
among the public, not only in the specific context of rumors 
but also in general social media use. There is a need to curb 
online incivility and hate speech. 
This study has two limitations. First, it only compares two 
cases with a stark difference in terms of how the public 
responds. Future studies should include more cases so that a 
more definitive pattern can emerge. Second, the discussion on 
how existing evidence being rumored could influence public 
responses should be more in-depth, including the transcript 
and other supporting materials. 
REFERENCES 
[1] G. W. Allport, and L. Postman, “An analysis of rumor,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly, vol. 10, pp. 501-517, 1946. 
[2] J. A. Gibbons, A. F. Lukowski, and W. R. Walker, “Exposure increases 
the believability of unbelievable news headlines via elaborate cognitive 
processing”, Media Psychology, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 273-300, 2005. 
[3] G. M. Majid, and A. Pal, “Conspiracy and Rumor Correction: Analysis 
of Social Media Users’ Comments,” Proc of the International 
Conference on Information and Computer Technologies, IEEE, Mar. 
2020, pp. 331-335. 
[4] A. Y. Chua, and S. Banerjee, “Intentions to trust and share online health 
rumors: An experiment with medical professionals,” Computers in 
Human Behavior, vol. 87, pp. 1-9, 2018. 
[5] Y. Liu, X. Jin, and H. Shen, “Towards early identification of online 
rumors based on long short-term memory networks”, Information 
Processing & Management, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 1457-1467, 2019. 
[6] A. Pal, A. Y. Chua, and D. H. L. Goh, "Debunking rumors on social 
media: The use of denials," Computers in Human Behavior, vol. 96, 
pp. 110-122, 2019. 
[7] V. Goel, S. Raj, and P. Ravichandran, “How WhatsApp Leads Mobs to 
Murder in India,” Jul. 2018. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/07/18/technology/whatsap 
p-india-killings.html 
[8] J. Shin, L. Jian, K. Driscoll, and F. Bar, “Political rumoring on Twitter 
during the 2012 US presidential election: Rumor diffusion and 
correction,” New Media & Society, vol. 19, no. 8, pp. 1214-1235, 2017. 
[9] H. Huang, “A war of (mis) information: The political effects of rumors 
and rumor rebuttals in an authoritarian country,” British Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 283-311, 2017. 
[10] B. E. Weeks, and R. K. Garrett, “Electoral consequences of political 
rumors: Motivated reasoning, candidate rumors, and vote choice during 
the 2008 US presidential election,” International Journal of Public 
Opinion Research, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 401-422, 2014. 
[11] A. Pal, and S. Banerjee, “Understanding online falsehood from the 
perspective of social problem,” In I. Chiluwa, & S. Samoilenko (Eds.), 
Handbook of Research on Deception, Fake News, and Misinformation 
Online, pp. 1-17, 2019, IGI Global. 
[12] A. Pal, A. Y. Chua, and D. H. L. Goh, “How do users respond to online 
rumor rebuttals?,” Computers in Human Behavior, vol. 106, 106243, 
2020. 
[13] A. Y. Chua, and S. Banerjee, “Rumor verifications on Facebook: Click 
speech of likes, comments and shares,” Proc of the International 
Conference on Digital Information Management, IEEE, Sep. 2017, pp. 
257-262. 
[14] A. Y. Chua, and S. Banerjee, “Rumors and rumor corrections on 
Twitter: Studying message characteristics and opinion leadership,” 
Proc of the International Conference on Information Management, 
IEEE, May 2018, pp. 210-214. 
[15] L. Bode, and E. K. Vraga, “See something, say something: Correction 
of global health misinformation on social media,” Health 
Communication, vol. 33, no. 9, pp. 1131-1140, 2018. 
[16] S. Lewandowsky, U. K. Ecker, C. M. Seifert, N. Schwarz, and J. Cook, 
“Misinformation and its correction continued influence and successful 
debiasing,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest, vol. 13, no. 3, 
pp. 106-131, 2012. 
[17] B. Nyhan, and J. Reifler, “When corrections fail: The persistence of 
political misperceptions,” Political Behavior, vol. 32, no. (2), pp. 303-
330, 2010. 
[18] S. Lewandowsky, W. G. Stritzke, A. M. Freund, K. Oberauer, and J. I. 
Krueger, “Misinformation, disinformation, and violent conflict: From 
Iraq and the ‘War on Terror’ to future threats to peace,” American 
Psychologist, vol. 68, no. 7, pp. 487-501, 2013. 
[19] A. Pal, A. Y. K. Chua, and D. H. L. Goh, “Salient beliefs about sharing 
rumor denials on the Internet,” Proc of the International Conference on 
Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication, ACM, Jan. 
2018, p. 57. 
[20] L. Rösner, and N. C. Krämer, “Verbal venting in the social web: Effects 
of anonymity and group norms on aggressive language use in online 
comments,” Social Media + Society, pp. 1-13, 2016. 
[21] V. S. Chavan, and S. Shylaja, “Machine learning approach for 
detection of cyber-aggressive comments by peers on social media 
network,” Proc of the International Conference on Advances in 
Computing, Communications and Informatics, Aug. 2015, pp. 2354-
2358. 
[22] R. Young, S. Miles, and S. Alhabash, “Attacks by Anons: A content 
analysis of aggressive posts, victim responses, and bystander 
interventions on a social media site,” Social Media + Society, pp. 1-14, 
2018. 
[23] K. Coe, K. Kenski, and S. A. Rains, “Online and uncivil? Patterns and 
determinants of incivility in newspaper website comments,” Journal of 
Communication, vol. 64, pp. 658-679, 2014. 
[24] J. Gonçalves, “Aggression in news comments: How context and article 
topic shape user-generated content,” Journal of Applied 
Communication Research, vol. 46 no. 5, pp. 604-620, 2018.  
[25] A. A. Anderson, S. K. Yeo, D. Brossard, D. A. Scheufele, and M. A. 
Xenos, “Toxic talk: How online incivility can undermine perceptions 
of media,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research, vol. 30, 
no. 1, pp. 156-168, 2018. 
[26] I. Rowe, “Civility 2.0: A comparative analysis of incivility in online 
political discussion,” Information, Communication & Society, vol. 18, 
no. 2, pp. 121-138, 2015. 
[27] A. Santoso, “Polisi Usut Netizen yang Sebar Hoax Bocah Perusuh 
Tewas Dipukuli di Kampung Bali,” Detik.com., May 25, 2019, 
Retrieved from https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4564462/polisi-usut- 
netizen-yang-sebar-hoax-bocah-tewas-dipukuli-di-kampung-bali 
[28] N. Habibie, “Pengakuan Andri Bibir, Pria yang Dipukul Brimob di 
Kampung Bali,” Liputan6.com., May 25, 2019. Retrieved from 
https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/3975513/pengakuan-andri-bibir- 
pria-yang-dipukul-brimob-di-kampung-bali 
[29] Z. Lilland, “Viral Foto ‘Brimob Sipit’, Polri: Semua Personel WNI,” 
Detik.com., May 22, 2019. Retrieved from 
https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4560137/viral-foto-brimob-sipit-polri- 
semua-personel-wni 
[30] A. Santoso, “Anggota Brimob yang Dituduh dari China Buka Suara: 
Saya Asli Indonesia”, Detik.com., May 24, 2019.  Retrieved from 
https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4563679/anggota-brimob-yang- 
dituduh-dari-china-buka-suara-saya-asli-indonesia 
[31] D. Halim, “Penyebar Hoaks Ada Brimob dari China Minta Maaf,” 
Kompas. May 24, 2019. Retrieved from 
https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/05/24/18241461/penyebar- 
hoaks-ada-brimob-dari-china-minta-maaf 
[32] Katadata. “YouTube, Medsos No. 1 di Indonesia,” Mar. 6, 2019. 
https://katadata.co.id/infografik/2019/03/06/youtube-medsos-no-1-di- 
indonesia.  
